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ABSTRACT
Since statehood, Alaska has had one of the worst unemployment rates in the
nation. The state has long combated its joblessness epidemic with a suite of laws
known as Alaska Hire, which imposes a resident hiring preference on public
works projects in the state. This popular law has been in place in one form or
another since the state’s first legislature passed an early version in 1960.
Alaska Hire’s story changed when former Attorney General Kevin Clarkson
wrote a memo to Governor Mike Dunleavy arguing that the law is
unconstitutional under the federal Privileges and Immunities Clause and the
Alaska Equal Protection Clause, and that the statute should no longer be
enforced. This Note provides a counterpoint to Attorney General Clarkson’s
memo by showing that Alaska Hire is legal under both the federal and state
constitutions. The Note contends that Alaska’s unique circumstances coupled
with the legal improvements the current version of Alaska Hire has made in
light of its predecessors’ defects cut against Attorney General Clarkson’s
arguments. With the future of Alaska Hire in question, this Note hopes to
provide a starting point for any future legal defenses of this eminently
important law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
What can a state do to lift its residents out of unemployment?1 This
question is of acute relevance to the citizens of Alaska, whose state has
the worst jobless rate2 in the nation.3 Since 1976, Alaska has endured
stubbornly high unemployment with a jobless rate averaging nearly eight
percent.4 That figure is twenty-seven percent higher than the national
average5 and is shockingly close to the ten percent unemployment rate
seen nationally at the peak of the Great Recession.6 These numbers are all
the more staggering when accounting for the immense economic
prosperity the United States has experienced in the past several decades.7
1. The U.S. government defines a person as unemployed if “they do not
have a job, have actively looked for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently
available for work.” How the Government Measures Unemployment, U.S. BUREAU
LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_htgm.htm#employed (last modified
Oct. 8, 2015).
2. “Unemployment” and “jobless” are used interchangeably throughout
this Note.
3. U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T LAB., STATE EMPLOYMENT AND
UNEMPLOYMENT – JANUARY 2020, at 1 (2020),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/laus_03162020.pdf. In January
2020, Alaska had an unemployment rate of six percent, the highest of the fifty
states and the District of Columbia. Id. When referring to unemployment trends
in Alaska and the United States at large, this Note does not include statistics from
after January 2020 unless specifically noted. This is because of the unique impact
of the COVID-19 pandemic and its attendant public health measures on the
national job market. See, e.g., Neil Irwin, A Jobs Report Without Silver Linings, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/upshot/jobsreport-unemployment.html (describing job loss due to the COVID-19 pandemic);
see also Unemployment Rates for States, Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/web/laus/laumstrk.htm (last modified Apr. 16, 2021)
(noting that as of December 2020, Alaska has an unemployment of 5.8%, the 27th
highest in the nation and Hawai’i has the largest, at 9.3%).
4. BLS Data Series LASST020000000000003, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate (last modified Mar. 3, 2021) (enter series id
LASST020000000000003, click “next—>,” “all years,” then “retrieve data”).
Unfortunately, readily available data does not go back to the start of Alaska’s
statehood in 1959. 1976 is the earliest year for which data is available.
5. Compare id., with Unemployment Rate—Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. BUREAU
LAB. STAT., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate (enter series id LNS14000000,
click “next—>,” “all years,” then “retrieve data”).
6. U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T LAB., THE RECESSION OF 2007–2009, BLS
SPOTLIGHT ON STATISTICS 2 (2012),
https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2012/recession/pdf/recession_bls_spotlight.p
df. The national unemployment rate reached 14.7% in April 2020, the highest
jobless rate during the COVID-19 pandemic. U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T
LAB., Unemployment Rate Rises to Record High 14.7 Percent in April 2020, TED: THE
ECON. DAILY (May 13, 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2020/unemployment-rate-rises-to-recordhigh-14-point-7-percent-in-april-2020.htm?.
7. Between 1980 and 2019, the United States accounted for twenty to twenty-
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The sources of the joblessness epidemic, including geography,
demographics, and non-resident workers, form a complex puzzle.8 The
Alaskan legislature has confronted one piece of this puzzle, non-resident
workers, with a suite of laws popularly known as Alaska Hire. Since its
inception in 1960,9 the legislative program has required favored hiring of
Alaska residents for public works projects in the state.10 The current
version of the law allows the Commissioner of Labor and Workforce
Development to set a resident hiring preference11 for select public works
projects.12
However, in October 2019, Alaska Attorney General Kevin
Clarkson13 wrote a memo to Governor Mike Dunleavy14 opining that this
iteration of Alaska Hire is unconstitutional under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution15 and Alaska’s Equal Rights,
five percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) based on Purchasing Power
Parity (PPP). GDP Based on PPP, Share of World, INT’L MONETARY FUND,
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC
/WEOWORLD (last visited Mar. 26, 2020) (select “United States” on “Country”
scroll menu).
8. See infra Section II.
9. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.150 (2019); ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.030 (1972),
invalidated by Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); 1960 Alaska Sess. Laws ch.
177 (enacted as ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.010 (1960)), invalidated by Robison v.
Francis, 713 P.2d 259 (Alaska 1986).
10. See ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.150 (2019); ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.030 (1972),
invalidated by Hicklin, 437 U.S. 518; 1960 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 177 (enacted as
ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.010 (1960)), invalidated by Robison, 713 P.2d 259.
11. A resident hiring preference is a required percentage of resident workers
employed on a given project. See Robert A. Beauregard, Resident Hiring Preference
Ordinances: A Comparative Analysis, 1 ECON. DEV. Q. 124 (May 1987).
12. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.150 (2019). Imposing a hiring preference requires the
Commissioner to make a determination, based on statutory factors, that a zone
exists and then to set the level of the hiring preference, again based on other
statutory factors. Id. § 36.10.150(b)–(c); see also infra Sections III.D–E.
13. Attorney General Clarkson resigned from his position in August 2020
after it emerged that he had sent inappropriate text messages to a state employee.
See, e.g., Azi Paybarah, Alaska Attorney General Resigns Over Texts to Female State
Worker, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/us/alaska-clarkson-resignation.html.
14. Memorandum from Kevin G. Clarkson, Att’y Gen., Alaska to Michael J.
Dunleavy, Governor, Alaska (Oct. 3, 2019),
http://law.alaska.gov/pdf/opinions/opinions_2019/19-005_AK-hire.pdf
[hereinafter Clarkson Memo].
15. “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. “The
object of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is to ‘strongly . . . constitute the
citizens of the United States [as] one people,’ by ‘plac[ing] the citizens of each State
upon the same footing with citizens of other States so far as the advantages
resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned.’” Lunding v. N.Y. Tax
Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 296 (1998) (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168
(1869)). However, the Clause does not mean that “state citizenship or residency
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Opportunities, and Protection Clause (the “Alaska Equal Protection
Clause”)16 and thus should not be enforced.17 The thrust of this argument,
which lacks substantive analysis of the current iteration of the Alaska Hire
statute, is that mitigating unemployment is not a legitimate legislative
goal and a resident hiring preference does not form a constitutionally
required close nexus with that goal.18 With the future of the statute in
limbo, this Note offers a counterargument to the Attorney General’s
memo by contending that Alaska Hire is valid under both constitutions.
The unemployment epidemic that Alaska Hire is intended to
mitigate is a result of
Alaska’s unique characteristics: Alaska’s
geographic remoteness makes employment of most residents outside of
the state infeasible;19 demographic and economic trends show that more
Alaskans will be vying for fewer in-state jobs in the future;20 and
nonresident workers account for over a fifth of the state’s workforce.21 As
this Note will argue, it is legally significant that these characteristics are
either inherent to the state—as in the case of geography—or so deeply
entrenched as to be innate features of the state economy.22
Efforts to use statutory guardrails to mitigate unemployment in
Alaska date back to 1960, when the state’s first legislature took action to
secure employment opportunities for the state’s residents with the first
iteration of what came to be known as Alaska Hire.23 This initial law,
which required preferential hiring for Alaska residents on public works
projects,24 was supplemented in 1972 with a law that expanded the hiring
may never be used by a State to distinguish among persons” and States do not
always have to “apply all [of their] laws or all [of their] services equally to anyone,
resident or nonresident, who may request to do so.” Baldwin v. Fish & Game
Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
16. “This constitution is dedicated to the principles that all persons have a
natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the
rewards of their own industry; that all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights,
opportunities, and protection under the law; and that all persons have corresponding
obligations to the people and to the state.” ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis
added).
17. Clarkson Memo, supra note 14, at 2.
18. Id. at 10. The test described here is derived from State v. Enserch Alaska
Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989). See infra Section III.E.
19. See infra Section II.A.
20. See infra Section II.B.
21. See infra Section II.C.
22. See infra Section IV.B. for a discussion of how these features of Alaska
create a significant state interest for purposes of the Alaska Equal Protection
Clause. For a full discussion of how intractable these characteristics are, see infra
Section II.
23. ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.10.010–.110 (1960) (repealed 1986).
24. Public works here refers to “contracts let by the state boroughs, cities and
school districts for construction, repair, preliminary surveys, engineering studies
or maintenance work.” Id. § 36.10.010.
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preference to contexts involving oil and gas leases.25
In 1978, shortly after Alaska Hire was expanded to include oil and
gas leases, the statutory scheme faced its first major legal challenge in
Hicklin v. Orbick,26 in which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the
expansion on the grounds that it violated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.27 Alaska Hire faced another constitutional
challenge in 1986 with Robison v. Francis,28 wherein the public works
portion of the statute was invalidated under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.29 In response to Hicklin and Robison, the Alaska
legislature enacted the current iteration of the law, which significantly
curtailed the reach of the statute.30 In 1989, a limited provision of that law
was struck down as invalid under the Alaska Equal Protection Clause in
State v. Enserch Alaska Construction, Inc.31 Since this period of upheaval,
the status of Alaska Hire was relatively unchanged for thirty years and
continued to be enforced by the state largely without pause.32
This legal calm came to an end in October 2019, with the release of
Attorney General Clarkson’s memo to Governor Dunleavy and an end to
Alaska Hire’s enforcement.33 Not long after the memo was announced,

25. Id. §§ 38.40.010–.090 (1972), invalidated by Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518
(1978).
26. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
27. Id. at 523–30.
28. 713 P.2d 259 (Alaska 1986).
29. See id. at 266; see also infra Section III.C.
30. See 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 33; see also infra Section III.D.
31. 787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989).
32. See Clarkson Memo, supra note 14, at 5 (“Since [Enserch], the Department of
Labor and Workforce Development has consistently designated the entire State as
a ‘zone of underemployment,’” allowing enforcement of Alaska Hire’s resident
hiring preferences on public works throughout the state); see also State Settles
Lawsuit Over Alaska Hire Employment Statute, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 28, 2019),
https://apnews.com/dc626ff5e41649908bb3eca1d1e926ad (“This is a law that’s
been on the books for over 30 years. It’s been a law that probably six or eight
different governors have followed and probably eight or 10 attorney generals
have followed, Republicans and Democrats and independents.”). The lone
exception to this continual enforcement was a two-year suspension in the
aftermath of the Great Recession. Elwood Brehmer, Alaska Hire Preference in Limbo
After
AG
Drops
Defense,
ALASKA J. COM.
(Oct.
30,
2019),
https://www.alaskajournal.com/2019-10-30/alaska-hire-preference-limboafter-ag-drops-defense (“The resident hiring preference was suspended in 2013
under former Gov. Sean Parnell when the Lower 48 was continuing to recover
from the Great Recession that largely missed Alaska. It was reinstated statewide
in June 2015 by Gov. Bill Walker’s administration after the national
unemployment rate had fallen below Alaska’s . . . .”).
33. See Clarkson Memo, supra note 14, at 1 (“I have concluded that Alaska Hire
violates both the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions, and that the State should stop
enforcing its provisions.”).
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the state settled a suit challenging the validity of the statute for $50,000.34
While the memo has no binding effect, the settlement clearly signaled the
executive branch’s refusal to continue enforcing Alaska Hire. Without
enforcement of the statute, a key tool for mitigating unemployment in
Alaska has been rendered nugatory. In response to these developments,
this Note offers a rebuttal to Attorney General Clarkson’s opinion by
arguing that Alaska Hire is indeed constitutional under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Alaska Equal
Protection Clause. In making this argument, this Note aims to provide the
building blocks for any legal defense of the statute that may arise in the
future.
This Note proceeds in three sections. Section II begins by describing
the idiosyncratic circumstances in which Alaska’s unemployment
problem exists. These circumstances are created by the combination of
Alaska’s geography, demographics, economic trends, and the prevalence
of nonresidents in Alaska’s economy. Having established both the
conditions that Alaska Hire is meant to address and the context in which
it must be legally analyzed, Section III reviews the statutory evolution of
Alaska Hire alongside the various legal challenges it has faced. In so
doing, this Section first illustrates the legal tests under which resident
hiring preferences are analyzed and the constitutional deficiencies of the
previous iterations of Alaska Hire. Section III then analyzes how the
current version of the statute has cured the defects of its predecessors.
Section IV argues that the current iteration of Alaska Hire is valid under
both the federal Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Alaska Equal
Protection Clause. This Section first contends that the unique
circumstances present in Alaska coupled with the narrow tailoring of the
statute’s hiring preference render the law constitutionally valid under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause. This Section concludes by finding the
statute constitutional under the Alaska Equal Protection Clause as it
addresses a compelling state interest with the least restrictive means
practicable.

II. WHY ALASKAN UNEMPLOYMENT IS UNIQUE
To understand both the necessity and the constitutionality of Alaska
Hire, it is important to appreciate how idiosyncratic the state’s
unemployment situation is. Alaska’s unemployment problem is uniquely
intractable. The intransigence and sheer scale of joblessness in Alaska
34. Elwood Brehmer, State Settles Alaska-Hire Lawsuit Brought by Contractor,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.adn.com/businesseconomy/2019/12/04/state-settles-alaska-hire-lawsuit-brought-by-contractor.
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over time puts it in a category apart from its peers. In all but six of the
years since 1980, the state’s unemployment rate has been in the in the top
ten nationally; for nearly half of those years, it had the highest
unemployment rate in the nation.35 The unyielding nature of the state’s
jobless rate, as well as economic projections,36 indicates a stark reality:
unemployment will likely continue to be prevalent among Alaska’s
residents.
This Section analyzes the reasons behind this unique problem by
identifying three contributing factors, which will be analyzed in turn: (a)
the scale of Alaska’s geography, (b) the impact of the state’s
demographics, and (c) the prevalence of nonresident workers in the
state’s economy. The strange brew concocted by the alchemy of these
three ingredients make unemployment seemingly endemic to Alaska.
However, the idiosyncratic combination of these factors highlights
Alaska’s exceptionalism in the context of tackling unemployment and
indicates that a resident hiring preference is an appropriate tool to
mitigate joblessness. Understanding the singular nature of Alaska’s
unemployment situation and the ways in which a resident hiring
preference is suitable to address that problem makes it possible to
comprehend the role — and propriety — of Alaska Hire.
A.

Alaska’s Geography

The reality presented by Alaska’s geography is the first factor
contributing to the uniqueness of the state’s joblessness problem. As any
elementary school geography student knows, Alaska is big — the state’s
landmass is equivalent to nearly twenty percent of the contiguous United
States’ land.37 The state is around 1,000 miles away from the lower forty-

35. See States and Selected Areas: Employment Status of the Civilian
Noninstitutional Population, January 1976 to Date, Seasonally Adjusted, BUREAU LAB.
STAT., https://www.bls.gov/web/laus/ststdsadata.txt (last visited Feb. 2020)
(providing data that can be used to calculate the ranked average unemployment
rate of every state by year).
36. See infra Section II.B.
37. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T COM., ALASKA: 2010 POPULATION AND
HOUSING
UNIT
COUNTS
10
(2012),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2010/cph-2/cph-23.pdf (presenting Alaska data); State Area Measurements and Internal Point
Coordinates,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/geographies/reference-files/2010/geo/statearea.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2021) (presenting federal data); see also How Big Is
Alaska, ALASKA.ORG, https://www.alaska.org/how-big-is-alaska (last visited
Mar. 19, 2020) (featuring an interactive tool to compare the size of Alaska to other
states).
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eight at its closest point.38 Within that huge area, only about sixty-six
percent of residents live in urban areas,39 well below the national average
of over eighty percent.40 Many of the state’s rural communities are
exceedingly isolated, and reliant on sea and air travel due to the lack of
road systems.41 In short, getting around — and out of — the state is not
easy and “‘rural’ in Alaska carries a unique meaning.”42 These inalterable
geographic realities mean that employment physically located inside of
the state is more practically accessible to Alaskan residents than
employment located elsewhere.
B.

The Impact of Alaska’s Demographics

Another factor that makes Alaska’s unemployment problem
distinctive is the relationship between the state’s demographics and
economic realities tied to employment. Between 2020 and 2025, the state’s
population is projected to grow by 0.6%, and then grow again by 0.5%
between 2025 and 2030.43 This expansion will be met with a projected
38. Driving Directions from Ketchikan, AK to Seattle, WA, GOOGLE MAPS,
https://www.google.com/maps (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search
starting point field for “Ketchikan, AK” and search destination field for “Seattle,
WA”). The shortest driving route between the two municipalities is 1,115 miles.
Id.
39. “The U.S. Census Bureau identifies two types of urban areas: Urbanized
Areas (UAs) of 50,000 or more people; Urban Clusters (UCs) of at least 2,500 and
less than 50,000 people. Urban and Rural, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geoareas/urban-rural.html (last visited Mar. 24, 2020). “‘Rural’ encompasses all
population, housing, and territory not included within an urban area.” Id.
40. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 37, at 9 (presenting Alaska data); 2010
Census Urban and Rural Classification and Urban Area Criteria, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geoareas/urban-rural/2010-urban-rural.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2021) (presenting
federal data).
41. See 99% Invisible: Dead Cars, RADIOTOPIA (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/dead-cars/ (describing transportation
in the Yukon-Kuskokwim Delta in light of the region’s lack of road system); see
also Kevin Baird, Senators Want More Answers on Marine Highway Closure, JUNEAU
EMPIRE (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.juneauempire.com/news/senators-wantmore-answers-on-marine-highway-closure/ (“If you shut down the ferry
operations, you are . . . potentially strangling those communities because they
may not make it through winter, if the airports can’t support them.”).
42. Natalie Landreth & Moira Smith, Voting Rights in Alaska: 1982–2006, 17 S.
CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 79, 82 (2007). This use of “rural” was in the context of
voter access, but the assertion holds true in the employment context.
43. EDDIE HUNSINGER ET AL., ALASKA DEP’T LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., ALASKA
POPULATION
PROJECTIONS:
2017
TO
2045,
at
15
(2018),
https://edyhsgr.github.io/documents/PopProj2017to2045.pdf. It should be
noted that population growth here refers to growth in the resident population. Id.
at 5.
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statewide job growth of only 0.4%, a fifty percent lag behind population
growth.44 Furthermore, the above-mentioned rural-urban divide45 is
critical, as urban areas experience notably more job growth than rural
areas.46 The lag in job growth in rural areas is not unique to Alaska, but
the pains of that lag are particularly acute within the state. Through 2030,
the population in Alaska’s rural regions is projected to grow by nearly ten
percent.47 The job growth in those same regions is projected to be much
lower than that ten percent — in some areas, there may be negative job
growth.48 While the projected lag is less severe in urbanized portions of
the state, job growth in Alaskan cities too will likely be unable to keep up
with population growth; there simply won’t be enough jobs for residents
of Alaska.49 This problem is all the more stark in comparison with the rest
of the country: prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the nation as a whole
was projected to experience 7.9% job growth, nearly 20 times higher than
projections for Alaska.50 The demographic and economic projections
portend an Alaska with more residents and far fewer local jobs to employ
them, putting the state in an extraordinary position as compared to its
peers.
C.

Alaska’s Emphasis on Nonresident Workers

The third factor contributing to Alaska’s unique unemployment
problem is the state economy’s emphasis on nonresident workers. In 2019,
over one-fifth of the workers in Alaska were nonresidents.51 The majority
of nonresident workers are employed in seasonal industries, with nearly
sixty percent of such workers spending less than half the year working in
44. SUSAN LUND ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., THE FUTURE OF WORK IN
AMERICA: PEOPLE AND PLACES, TODAY AND TOMORROW 55 (2019). National job
growth over the same period is projected to be nearly eight percent. See id. This
growth in jobs will be met with a more modest population increase between 2020
and 2030 of less than seven-and-a-half percent. See SANDRA L. COLBY & JENNIFER
M. ORTMAN, U.S. DEPT. OF COM., PROJECTIONS OF THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE
U.S. POPULATION: 2014 TO 2060, at 6 (2015).
45. See supra Section II.A.
46. Between 2007 and 2017, twenty-five urban areas accounted for over twothirds of the job growth in the U.S. LUND ET AL., supra note 44, at 4. Twenty-five
urban areas are projected to account for sixty percent of job growth through 2030.
Id. at 10.
47. HUNSINGER ET AL., supra note 43, at 26.
48. LUND ET AL., supra note 44 at 10–11.
49. See id. (describing the potential for net job loss in rural and urban
counties).
50. See id. at 55 (displaying projected net job growth for each of the fifty
states).
51. SARA WHITNEY & DAN ROBINSON, ALASKA DEP’T LABOR & WORKFORCE
DEV., NONRESIDENTS WORKING IN ALASKA 6 (2021).
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Alaska.52 The construction industry, which is the sector most engaged
with public works contracts (and which is not considered seasonal), has a
workforce that is over eighteen percent nonresident employees,53 with
nonresidents holding around twenty percent of unskilled positions.54 The
gravamen of these statistics is two-fold: one-fifth of Alaska’s workforce is
populated by nonresidents of the state and, while nonresidents have a
significant presence in the construction industry, it is by no means the
sector upon which this class of worker is most dependent. The first point
illustrates that nonresidents have a massive influence on employment
rates in Alaska; the second shows that even if nonresidents are disfavored
in the construction industry, they would still have job opportunities in the
state’s other sectors.
With more Alaskans trying to fill fewer positions in the future,
unmitigated economic embrace of nonresident workers will surely
exacerbate unemployment among residents. Nonresident workers in
Alaska have a proven willingness — and ability — to travel away from
home for work. There is no such presumption for natives of Alaska.
Indeed, Alaskans are uniquely tied to local jobs because of their state’s
geography.55 This means that in the context of unskilled positions, a role
filled by a nonresident equals denial of that position to a resident.
Critically, the converse of this equation is not true. Thus, a tool to mitigate
the displacement of residents from jobs by nonresidents, particularly in
the case of unskilled positions, is an appropriate tool to stem the tide of
resident joblessness.
The combination of the preceding three factors makes Alaska’s
unemployment problem unique. The state’s unemployment problem is
characterized by a number of uncontrollable factors, so the best way to
address the problem is by looking to a factor which can be controlled. Of
these factors, the one which Alaska’s government can decisively and
precisely impact, is the number of nonresidents working in Alaska.

III. THE EVOLUTION OF ALASKA HIRE
To understand both the necessity and the constitutionality of Alaska
Hire, it is important to appreciate the law’s statutory lineage. This Section

52. The vast majority of nonresident workers in Alaska are employed by
industries with “high seasonality.” Id. at 4, 8.
53. Id. at 10.
54. ROB KREIGER & SARA WHITNEY, ALASKA DEP’T LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV.,
NONRESIDENTS WORKING IN ALASKA 10 (2020). For purposes of this Note, what
positions the report labels as “Helpers” or “Construction Laborers” are
considered unskilled positions.
55. See supra Section II.A.
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will track the history of the statutory scheme chronologically, beginning
with the original 1960 version of the law, then the 1972 expansion. After
delving into Hicklin v. Orbeck,56 the first major challenge to Alaska Hire,
the Section will turn to the subsequent challenge presented in Robison v.
Francis.57 This Section then describes State v. Enserch Alaska Construction,
Inc.,58 the latest fully litigated challenge to the statute. This Section
concludes by describing the current state of Alaska Hire and the Clarkson
Memo. This discussion lays the groundwork for the conclusion that the
current iteration of Alaska Hire lacks the constitutional defects found in
its predecessors, which will be discussed fully in Section IV.
A.

The Birth of Alaska Hire

Reviewing the constitutional defects of earlier versions of Alaska
Hire illuminates the constitutional strengths of the statute’s current
iteration. Records of Alaska’s early legislative actions are sparse, so
information regarding the passage of Alaska Hire’s first iteration is
meager. However, the text of the enacted law makes clear its goal: put
Alaska residents to work. Under the law, on projects arising from public
works contracts59 with state, borough, and municipal governments,
ninety to ninety-five percent of workers were required to be qualified
state residents.60 Additionally, in the event of layoffs, such resident
workers were to be terminated last.61 To be considered a resident, an
individual had to have resided in Alaska for at least one year before their
employment on the contract.62 Contractors found in violation of the Act
would have an amount equal to that which would be paid to “a displaced
resident” deducted from their payment under the contract.63
This first version of Alaska Hire was extremely broad in its
envisioned application. There were only two statutory limits on the scope
of the law’s requirements. First, the statute’s provisions did not apply to
projects receiving federal aid if doing so would conflict with federal law
56. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
57. 713 P.2d 259 (Alaska 1986).
58. 787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989).
59. These contracts included those for “construction, repair, preliminary
surveys, engineering studies or maintenance work.” § 1(a), 1960 Alaska Sess.
Laws ch. 177 (enacted as ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.10.010–.110) (invalidated by Robison,
713 P.2d 259).
60. Id. On qualifying projects of ten or more workers, ninety-five percent of
those employed were required to be Alaska residents. Id. If the project employed
less than ten workers, that percentage dropped to ninety percent. Id.
61. Id. § 1(d).
62. Id. § 1(b)(1). The statute also required that the individual be a journeyman
or apprentice in their “particular trade.” Id. § 1(b)(2).
63. Id. § 8.
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prohibiting “preferences or discriminations among United States
citizens.”64 Second, contractors could petition the Commissioner of the
Department of Labor (“the Commissioner”) for an exemption if resident
workers were unavailable.65 Beyond these two caveats, the law clearly
envisioned an expansive role for itself in influencing the workforce
employed on public works projects.
A decade after the enactment of the first Alaska Hire statute, the
Alaska legislature expanded the law’s scope. In 1972, the statute was
amended to cover all employment resulting from oil and gas leases to
which the state was a party.66 The expansion’s resident hiring preference
covered contractors, subcontractors of contractors, and suppliers of
contractors and subcontractors.67 This meant that while the law was
ostensibly related to oil and gas leases, its scope was so wide that jobs
with only a tenuous connection to the energy sector fell under its
coverage.68 The legislative history is, again, unforthcoming, but the
statutorily-provided legislative findings are enlightening:
“The legislature finds that Alaska has a uniquely high
unemployment record among the states due both to cultural and
geographical migration barriers which record has existed for many years
and which experts have attested to will persist without drastic
governmental intervention. . . . [T]he state has an obligation to assure that
the benefits of [employment from oil and gas contracts] ensure to the
residents of the state.”69
Clearly, the legislature attributed Alaska’s unemployment epidemic
to the state’s unique features.
B.

The First Challenge: Hicklin v. Orbeck

It was the expansion of coverage to include oil and gas leases that
provoked the first legal challenge to Alaska Hire. Decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1978, Hicklin v. Orbeck found the resident hiring
preference in oil and gas contracts to be unconstitutional under the

64. Id. § 2.
65. Id. § 5.
66. ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.050 (1972) (repealed 1978) (“APPLICABILITY OF
CHAPTER. (a) The provisions of this chapter apply to all employment which is a
result of oil and gas leases, easements, leases or right-of-way permits for oil or gas
pipeline purposes, unitization agreements or any renegotiation of any of the
preceding to which the state is a party after the effective date of this chapter . . .
.”).
67. Id.
68. See infra Section III.B.
69. ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.020 (1972) (repealed 1978).
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Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution.70 The lessons
to be learned from Hicklin are three-fold. One, a resident hiring preference
necessarily implicates a right that is fundamental under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.71 Two, for a resident hiring preference to pass
constitutional muster, (a) nonresidents must be a “peculiar source of . . .
evil” such that there is a substantial reason for the discrimination against
them and (b) the discrimination against nonresidents must be reasonably
related to the danger this cohort poses.72 Three, under Privileges and
Immunities Clause analysis, state ownership of the property to which
discrimination is tied is one factor — and a potentially crucial one — in
support of said discrimination’s constitutionality.73 The upshot is that
while Alaska Hire’s resident hiring preference will necessarily face
scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the statute has a
clear road to constitutionality.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to ensure citizens of one state can enjoy certain
fundamental rights in other states.74 To assess compliance with this
purpose, challenges under the Clause are evaluated using a two-part test.
First, the court determines whether a fundamental right protected by the
clause is burdened.75 This analysis is necessary because “the clause . . .
secures and protects the right of a citizen of one State to pass into any
other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce,
trade, or business without molestation.”76 Second, if a fundamental right
70. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525 (1978).
71. See id. (describing precedent as “recogniz[ing] that a resident of one State
is constitutionally entitled to travel to another State for purposes of employment
free from discriminatory restrictions in favor of state residents imposed by the
other State”).
72. Id. at 525–26.
73. Id. at 529.
74. The rights protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause are “those
which are fundamental.” Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 76 (1872). Generally
speaking, the “sole purpose” of the clause is “to declare to the several States, that
whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as
you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither
more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other states within
your jurisdiction.” Id. at 77. The Supreme Court curbed this broad language in
later cases allowing disparate treatment of non-citizens by states if doing so did
not implicate rights fundamental to national unity. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (holding the right to hunt not protected
by the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
75. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 387. The reach of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause is limited to “fundamental rights” involving “basic and essential activities,
interference with which would frustrate the purposes of the formation of the
Union.” Id.
76. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 525 (quoting Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 430
(1871)).
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is indeed implicated, the state must show that (a) nonresidents present a
“peculiar source of the evil,” which shows that the discrimination has a
substantial reason, and (b) that there is “a reasonable relationship
between the danger represented by non-citizens” and the discrimination
imposed upon them.77
In applying this test to the oil and gas provision of Alaska Hire, the
Supreme Court found that the statute burdened the right to employment,
which was determined to be fundamental for purposes of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause.78 The Court then determined that no showing
was made that nonresidents presented a “peculiar source of evil” in the
context of unemployment.79 In fact, unemployment stemmed largely
from residents being unqualified for positions,80 a point this Note will
pick up later.81 Finally, it was held that the discrimination against
nonresidents did not bear a substantial relationship to the evil they were
said to represent.82 In so holding, Justice Brennan, on behalf of the Court,
wrote that the challenged provision “extends to employers who have no
connection whatsoever with the State’s oil and gas, perform no work on
state land, have no contractual relationship with the State, and receive no
payment from the State.”83 Accordingly, the provision was overinclusive
to the point of having an unconstitutionally wide application.
Despite these findings, the Court did not dismiss Alaska’s argument
that its interest in the jobs being regulated allowed for the challenged
discrimination.84 Indeed, Justice Brennan wrote that “a State’s ownership
of the property with which the statute is concerned is a factor — although
often the crucial factor — to be considered in evaluating whether the
statute’s discrimination against noncitizens violates the [Privileges and
Immunities] Clause.”85 A version of Alaska Hire which targets stateowned property is therefore less problematic under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause than one that encompasses activity in which the state
lacks a direct interest. While state interest in the activity targeted by a
resident hiring preference law gets the statute closer to constitutionality,
litigation after Hicklin showed that more is needed to pass constitutional
muster.

77. Id. at 525–26 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399 (1948)).
78. See id. at 525 (describing Court precedent finding the right to employment
to be fundamental under the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
79. Id. at 527.
80. Id. at 526–27.
81. See infra Section IV.A.
82. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 527.
83. Id. at 530.
84. See id. at 529.
85. Id.
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The Aftermath of Hicklin

After Hicklin v. Orbeck, the future of Alaska Hire’s public works
provision was in question. In response to this uncertainty, the state’s
Attorney General wrote a memo to the Commissioner arguing that the
remaining provisions of Alaska Hire were indeed constitutional under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause.86 This claim rested on the so-called
“‘market participant’ exception” (more commonly known as the “market
participant exception” in other constitutional contexts).87 In essence, the
Attorney General argued that because the state acted as a market
participant when engaging in public works contracts, it was able to
exercise the right to deal with whomever it chose (i.e. to prefer residents
over nonresidents).88
The legal path forward put forth by the Attorney General proved to
be short-lived. Just four years later, in 1986, the Alaska Supreme Court
decided Robison v. Francis, which held the public works provision of
Alaska Hire unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.89 As in Hicklin, it was established that the
challenged provision burdened a fundamental right, namely the right to
employment.90 The Court was also unpersuaded that nonresidents
presented a peculiar evil, noting, inter alia, the lower court’s findings that
Alaska’s unemployment rate was, at the time, close to the national
average.91 Having dispensed with these issues, the bulk of the opinion
discussed the relationship between the resident hiring preference and the
discrimination against nonresidents.
The Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that the relationship between
the harm presented by nonresidents and the discrimination brought
against them was constitutionally deficient.92 The court declared that
“discrimination for the purpose of benefiting local residents [is]
recognized by us as improper.”93 To begin this analysis, the Alaska
Supreme Court described the market participant exception to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause as creating a sliding scale of deference,
with “far-reaching” discrimination earning the state little deference and
86. Memorandum from Wilson L. Condon, Att’y Gen. to Edmund N. Orbeck,
Comm’r 1 (June 17, 1982), 1982 WL 43792.
87. See id. at 3–5.
88. Id. at 3.
89. Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259, 261 (Alaska 1986); see supra Section III.B
for a description of the test applied to statutes challenged under the federal
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
90. Robison, 713 P.2d at 265.
91. Id. at 262–63.
92. Id. at 266.
93. Id.
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narrowly tailored discrimination granting the state greater deference.94
The Court determined that Alaska was owed little deference regarding
the discrimination inherent to Alaska Hire’s public works provision as
almost all nonresidents were discriminated against (recall that ninety to
ninety-five percent of workers were required to be residents), and the
statute applied to subcontractors with no direct contractual relationship
to the state.95 The important implication of this reasoning is that if the
resident hiring preference was more narrowly tailored, Alaska would
have been afforded more deference under the market participant
exception.
In another thread of analysis, the Alaska Supreme Court compared
the contemporary Alaskan economy with that of Camden, New Jersey.96
This discussion sheds light on the contribution that a locality’s unique
circumstances play in analyzing the constitutionality of resident hiring
preferences. The potentially flummoxing comparison between Alaska
and Camden was made by the Court in light of the landmark Privileges
and Immunities Clause case, United Building & Construction Trades Council
v. Mayor of Camden,97 which analyzed a municipal ordinance requiring
that forty percent of employees on city construction projects be city
residents.98 Whereas Camden’s economy was in a condition of decay with
high unemployment and the challenged ordinance contained a goal of
forty percent resident employment, at the time Robison was decided,
Alaska’s economy was growing, unemployment was low, and the statute
required resident employment of ninety percent or more.99 The court in
Robison found that Camden’s distinct circumstances, as well as the fact that
the U.S. Supreme Court did not reach a decision on the merits, meant the
case did not support Alaska Hire’s constitutionality.100 Still, while Camden
was not decided on the merits, the Court appeared to look favorably on
the fact that the Camden ordinance was “merely setting conditions on the
expenditures of funds [the city government] control[led].”101
94. Id. at 264. The oil and gas lease provision of Alaska Hire invalidated in
Hicklin was cited as a state action meriting little deference due to its broad reach.
Id. at 264–65; see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (“[T]he States
should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing
appropriate cures.”).
95. Robison, 713 P.2d at 265.
96. Id. at 269.
97. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
98. Id. at 208.
99. Robison, 713 P.2d at 269.
100. Id. A decision was not reached on the merits because there had been
neither a trial nor findings of fact below, and “[i]t would not be appropriate for
[the Supreme] Court . . . to make factual determinations.” Camden, 465 U.S. at 223.
Accordingly, the case was remanded. Id.
101. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 223 (noting that states are afforded particular
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D.Legislative Responses to Hicklin and Robison
In 1986, just months after Robison v. Francis was decided, in order “to
better fulfill the state’s duty of loyalty to its citizens,”102 the Alaska
legislature passed the version of Alaska Hire that largely remains in place
to this day.103 The defeats of Hicklin and Robison were clearly on the minds
of the drafters of this new law as its content largely responds to the defects
of its predecessors.104 The contemporary iteration of Alaska Hire corrects
the deficiencies of its antecedents by being both more narrow and more
flexible in its application — two characteristics relevant to Privileges and
Immunities Clause analysis.105
Compared to the oil and gas provision invalidated in Hicklin, the
1986 version of Alaska Hire is narrowly circumscribed as it applies only
to public works contracts.106 The current version is also much more
flexible than the iteration invalidated in Robison — gone are the rigid
requirements that nearly all employees under eligible contracts be
residents of Alaska.107 In place of these requirements are two more
forgiving mechanisms for determining both the applicability and the size
of the hiring preference.
The first of these mechanisms is the zone of underemployment
provision.108 Under this provision, the Commissioner first ascertains

deference in “analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures” when
these relate to the spending of state funds).
102. § 1, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 33.
103. ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.10.005–.990 (2019).
104. See, e.g., § 1, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 33 (“If the courts find that a
portion of AS 36.10 is unconstitutional, the public interest requires that the
remaining portions be implemented as fully as possible.”).
105. See infra Section IV.A.
106. See ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.180 (2019). Subsection 36.10.180(1) of the Alaska
Statutes applies to contracts
for construction, repair, preliminary surveys, engineering studies, consulting,
maintenance work, or any other retention of services necessary to complete a
given project that is let by the state or an agency of the state, a department, office,
state board, commission, public corporation, or other organizational unit of or
created under the executive, legislative or judicial branch of state government.
Subsections 36.10.180(2)–(4) of the Alaska Statutes apply to public works projects
under a grant. Subsection 36.10.180(5) of the Alaska Statutes applies to “any other
public works project or construction project that is funded in whole or in part by
state money.”
107. See ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.010 (1960) (repealed 1986). On qualifying
projects of ten or more workers, ninety-five percent of those employed were
required to be Alaska residents. Id. If the project employed fewer than ten
workers, that percentage dropped to ninety percent. Id.
108. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.150 (2019).
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whether a zone109 of underemployment exists,110 then determines what
amount of work has to be performed by qualified residents within that
zone.111 A zone is identified as eligible for a resident hiring preference
through an active consideration of statutorily-enumerated factors, which
include:
(1) the rate of unemployment within the zone is substantially
higher than the national rate of unemployment;
(2) a substantial number of residents in the zone have experience
or training in occupations that would be employed on a public
works project;
(3) the lack of employment opportunities in the zone has
substantially contributed to serious social or economic problems
in the zone; and
(4) employment of workers who are not residents is a peculiar
source of the unemployment of residents of the zone.112
The required level of resident employment on applicable projects is
set to a level deemed appropriate after consideration of “the nature of the
work, the classification of workers, availability of eligible residents, and
the willingness of eligible residents to perform the work.”113 The required
level is to be revisited every two years and applied on a craft-by-craft
basis.114 Despite Attorney General Clarkson’s memo indicating that the
zone of underemployment provision will no longer be enforced, it
remains on the books to this day.115
The second flexible mechanism introduced in the 1986 version of
Alaska Hire was the now-invalidated economically distressed zones
provision.116 As with the zone of underemployment provision, the
Commissioner would first determine whether an economically distressed
zone existed based on statutorily enumerated factors.117 These factors
were:
(1) the per capita income of residents of the zone [was] less than
90 percent of the per capita income of the United States as a
109. A zone “includes a census area in the state, an economic region of the
state, and the state as a whole.” Id. § 36.10.990.
110. Id. § 36.10.150(c).
111. See id. § 36.10.150(b) (“In making this determination, the commissioner
shall consider the nature of the work, the classification of workers, availability of
eligible residents, and the willingness of eligible residents to perform work.”).
112. Id. § 36.10.150(c).
113. Id. § 36.10.150(b).
114. Id. § 36.10.150(a).
115. See infra Section III.F (discussing the Clarkson Memo in detail).
116. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.160, invalidated by State v. Enserch Alaska Constr.,
Inc., 787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989).
117. Id. § 36.10.160(b).
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whole, or the unemployment rate in the zone exceed[ed] the
national rate of unemployment by at least five percentage points;
(2) the lack of employment in the zone . . . substantially
contributed to serious social or economic problems in the zone;
and
(3) employment of workers who [were] not residents [was] a
peculiar source of unemployment of residents of the zone.118
Upon determination of such a zone, qualified residents were to be
given preference for at least fifty percent of employment on eligible
projects within the zone.119 Despite its flexibility, the economically
distressed zones provision was ultimately found invalid in State v.
Enserch.120
The 1986 version of the law also includes hiring preferences for
economically disadvantaged minority residents121 and economically
disadvantaged female residents.122 Similar to the zone of
underemployment and economically distressed zones provisions, the
minority and female resident hiring preferences are triggered by the
determination of the Commissioner.123 In the case of minority residents,124
the Commissioner is required to find that: “the percentage of civilian
minority residents in the zone exceeds the percentage of civilian minority
residents in the state;” either the percent of unemployment of the
minority residents of the zone is at least two times the unemployment rate
of nonminority residents, or the minority population of the zone “has
suffered past economic discrimination;” the economic disadvantage has
substantially contributed to “serious social or economic problems” in the
zone; and employment of nonresidents of the zone “is a peculiar source
of unemployment” of minority residents of the zone.125 If such a zone is
found to exist, qualified minority residents are given a hiring preference
of either twenty-five percent, “or a percent representative of the civilian
minority residents in the zone, whichever is greater” on public works
sited within the zone.126
118. Id.
119. Id. § 36.10.160(a).
120. See infra Section III.E (discussing Enserch in more detail).
121. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.170 (2019).
122. Id. § 36.10.175.
123. Id.; see also § 36.10.170 (delineating the hiring preferences for various
minority residents).
124. “[A] person is considered to be a member of a minority if the person is
Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander, American Indian or Alaskan Native, or Black
as those terms are defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.”
Id. § 36.10.170(c).
125. Id. § 36.10.170(b)(1)–(4).
126. Id. § 36.10.170(a).
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Under the 1986 version of Alaska Hire, a hiring preference for
women is imposed when the Commissioner determines that: either the
unemployment rate of female residents of a zone is at least two times that
of male residents of the zone, or “the female population of the zone has
suffered past economic discrimination;” “the economic disadvantage of
female residents of the zone has substantially contributed to serious social
or economic problems in the zone;” and employment of nonresidents in
the zone is “a peculiar source of unemployment of female residents of the
zone.”127 Upon such a determination, the statute requires that the
workforce on public works projects within the zone be composed of at
least twenty-five percent resident women.128
The type of work to which Alaska Hire’s hiring preference applied
was the same regardless of whether it was being imposed under the zone
of underemployment, economically distressed zones, minority resident,
or female resident provision. The preference was applicable to all work
performed
under a contract for construction, repair, preliminary surveys,
engineering studies, consulting, maintenance work, or any other
retention of services necessary to complete a given project that is let by
the state or an agency of the state, a department, office, state board,
commission, public corporation, or other organizational unit of or created
under the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of state government,
including the University of Alaska and the Alaska Railroad Corporation,
or by a political subdivision of the state including a regional school board
with respect to an educational facility.129
It could also be applied to public works projects funded by state
grants.130 Finally, “any other public works project or construction project
that is funded in whole or in part by state money” could be subject to a
hiring preference.131
The current iteration of Alaska Hire was enacted with features which
sought to cure the defects of its predecessors. The statute’s narrow
application to public works cured the concerns highlighted in Hicklin,
while the flexibility afforded by the zones of underemployment and
economically distressed zones provisions addressed the concerns raised
in Robison. However, this refined version still contained limited
constitutional failings.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. § 36.10.175(b)(1)–(3).
Id. § 36.10.175(a).
Id. § 36.10.180(a)(1).
Id. § 36.10.180(a)(2)–(4).
Id. § 36.10.180(a)(5).
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The Enserch Challenge

The first legal challenge to the post-Robison version of Alaska Hire
came in 1989. State v. Enserch arose from a contract between Alaska and
Enserch Alaska Construction (“Enserch”) to build a road in the Northwest
Arctic Borough (“Borough”).132 The Commissioner declared the Borough
an economically distressed zone after Enserch began work, meaning the
project had to scale up the proportion of residents on its workforce.133
Enserch filed suit, seeking a declaration that Alaska Statutes section
36.10.160 violated state and federal Equal Protection guarantees and the
federal Privileges and Immunities Clause.134 The trial court dismissed the
Privileges and Immunities claim due to lack of standing, but found in
favor of Enserch as to the state Equal Protection claim.135
On appeal, the state supreme court conducted its analysis under the
Alaska Equal Protection Clause through application of Alaska’s sliding
scale approach.136 Courts apply the test by first determining the
importance of the individual interest impaired by the challenged state
action.137 The court then determines the importance of the state interest
underlying the action.138 Depending on the importance of the individual
interest, the state interest must fall “on a continuum from mere legitimacy
to a compelling interest.”139 Finally, the court examines the nexus between
the state interest and the means used to further the interest.140 Depending
upon the importance of the individual interest, “the nexus must fall
somewhere on a continuum from substantial relationship to least
restrictive means.”141
The court in Enserch differentiated this sliding scale approach from
the tiered test used in federal Equal Protection analysis.142 In the federal
test, there are three distinct standards of review in Equal Protection
analysis, each related to the type of classification and right implicated.143

132. State v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 626 (Alaska 1989).
133. Id. at 627.
134. Id. Enserch also sought damages for the increased cost incurred by
complying with section 36.10.160 of the Alaska Statutes. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 631. For a more in-depth discussion of the Alaska Equal Protection
Clause, see Paul E. McGreal, Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or Common
Law?, 15 ALASKA L. REV. 209 (1998).
137. Enserch, 787 P.2d at 631.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 631–32.
142. Id. at 631.
143. The rational basis standard is the lowest level of review, requiring the
means utilized by states to have a rational relation to a legitimate legislative
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This contrasts (at least formally) with the continuum standard applied in
Alaska Equal Protection analysis. The court noted this difference to
highlight that the Alaska Constitution “often provides greater protection
to individual rights than does the U.S. Constitution.”144 This means that
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution establishes the
minimum level of protection for rights implicated by resident hiring
preferences, while the corresponding clause of the Alaska Constitution
may require more stringent safeguards.145
In Enserch, the impaired individual interest was the right to engage
in an economic endeavor in a particular industry, an “important” right
for state equal protection purposes.146 The fact that the challenged
provision only applied to public works was not found to reduce the
impact of the disparate treatment it imposed.147 This was because public
works accounted for the majority of commercial construction in Alaska.148
The court also noted that because the hiring preference was limited to
residents of the economically distressed zone, the measure “impose[d]
significant limitations on construction workers’ overall employment
opportunities” and did not effectively address state-wide
unemployment.149 Finally, limiting the hiring preference to fifty percent
of a workforce created a nexus between the state interest and the means
used to further it, which was overly restrictive in light of the implicated
individual interest.150
objective. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980) (applying
rational basis standard to a statute restructuring railroad retirement benefits).
Strict scrutiny applies to statutes that purposefully discriminate against suspect
classifications, such as racial classifications. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 192–93 (1964) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute that implicated racial
classifications). The standard requires that the objective of the statute be actual
and compelling, and that the means employed be necessary and narrowly tailored
to accomplish the objective. See, e.g., id. at 193–94 (finding unconstitutional a
statute prohibiting overnight cohabitation of members of different races on the
grounds that there was no legislative purpose to “punish promiscuity” selectively
based upon race). Intermediate scrutiny applies to cases involving, inter alia, sexbased classifications and requires that the classification is substantially related to
an actual and important government interest. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 545–46 (1996) (finding unconstitutional the practice of only admitting
men to a state school because the goal of producing citizen-soldiers was not
“substantially advanced” by the discrimination).
144. Enserch, 787 P.2d at 631.
145. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The constitution does not prohibit the
State from granting preference, on the basis of Alaska residence, to residents of
the State over nonresidents to the extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution.”).
146. Enserch, 787 P.2d at 632.
147. Id. at 633.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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Turning to the state’s interest, the court identified the stated
purposes of the law to reduce resident unemployment, remedy social
harms associated with unemployment, and assist economically
disadvantaged residents as important.151 However, the court indicated
that these purposes “conceal[ed] the underlying objective of economically
assisting one class over another.”152 This led to the conclusion that “the
disparate treatment of unemployed workers in one region in order to
confer an economic benefit on similarly-situated workers in another
region” was not a legitimate purpose.153 In reaching this conclusion, the
court noted that the Alaska Equal Rights Clause affords “at least as much
protection intrastate to fundamental rights that the privileges and
immunities clause affords interstate,” and that it would be “anomalous”
to afford nonresidents a higher degree of constitutional protection than
residents who are also discriminated against.154
To conclude its equal protection analysis, the court described the
economically distressed zone provision as “seriously over- and
underinclusive [sic] because it does not prioritize relief for those areas
most affected by nonresident employment.”155 Because less distressed
zones were subject to the same hiring preference as more distressed
zones, residents of the former were unfairly advantaged over residents of
the latter.156 Furthermore, the economic criteria for designating an
economically distressed zone coupled with Alaska’s historically high
unemployment rate made it easy for the Commissioner to designate many
regions as distressed at any time.157
F.

Alaska Hire Today and the Clarkson Memo

Currently, most of the 1986 version of Alaska Hire remains on the
books.158 While the economically distressed zones provision was
invalidated in Enserch,159 the zone of underemployment, disadvantaged
minority resident, and female resident provisions are still in effect.160 This
means that the Commissioner may impose hiring preferences for all
residents, minority residents, and female residents within pre-

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 634.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 635.
See ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.10.005–990 (2019).
See supra Section III.E.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 36.10.150, 170–75 (2019).
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determined zones throughout the state of Alaska.161 The entire state has
“consistently” been designated a zone of underemployment since
Enserch.162 Accordingly, the Commissioner is statutorily able to impose a
hiring preference for residents on public works located anywhere in
Alaska.
Alaska Hire may still be on the books, but Alaska’s executive branch
has decided to cease enforcing the zone of underemployment provision
of the statute. This decision arose out of Attorney General Clarkson’s
memo asserting that the provision was unconstitutional under both the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Alaska
Equal Protection Clause.163 In analyzing the zone of underemployment
provision under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Attorney General
Clarkson argues that “Alaska Hire’s primary purpose is and always has
been protectionism.”164 This so-called protectionism derives from the
statute’s effect of “economically benefit[ing] Alaska residents at the
expense of nonresidents.”165 Citing Robison, Clarkson contends that the
Alaska Supreme Court has found that “this is not a legitimate government
purpose under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.”166
Turning to the Alaska Equal Protection Clause, Clarkson asserts that
the provision is unconstitutional on two grounds. First, “the disparate
treatment of unemployed workers in one region in order to confer an
economic benefit on similarly-situated workers in another region is not a
legitimate legislative goal.”167 Second, Clarkson argues that the nexus
between the state interest in alleviating unemployment and the means of
furthering it via a hiring preference is insufficiently close.168 He contends
that the zone of underemployment provision is both over- and underinclusive because it allows the Commissioner to provide relief to regions
less “affected by nonresident employment” while denying relief to “more
distressed zones.”169
When the executive branch declines to enforce a statutory scheme
that has been on the books in one form or another for half a century, the
decision should not be met with silence. Accordingly, the remainder of
this Note offers a voice in defense of Alaska Hire’s constitutionality.170
161. Id.
162. Clarkson Memo, supra note 14, at 5.
163. Id. at 1–2.
164. Id. at 8.
165. Id. at 7–8.
166. Id. at 8.
167. Id. at 10 (quoting State v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 634
(Alaska 1989)).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Attorney General Clarkson does not mention the disadvantaged minority
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ALASKA HIRE TODAY
In order to rebut the arguments put forth by Attorney General
Clarkson, it is necessary to show that Alaska Hire is constitutional under
both the federal Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Alaska Equal
Protection Clause.171 This Section will begin with an analysis of Alaska
Hire under the former. The road to legality is paved by two factors. First,
the “peculiar evil” posed by nonresidents in light of Alaska’s unique
circumstances. Second, the substantial relationship between the danger
posed by nonresidents and the discrimination brought against them by
the narrowly tailored, flexible version of Alaska Hire currently on the
books. The Section will then analyze the statute under the Alaska Equal
Protection Clause. Alaska Hire succeeds under the Alaska Equal
Protection Clause because, while the law implicates an important interest
for nonresidents, it also furthers a compelling state interest. Additionally,
the means used in furtherance of that state interest are the least restrictive
available.
A.

The Validity of Alaska Hire Under the Federal Privileges and
Immunities Clause

Alaska Hire is constitutional under the federal Privileges and
Immunities Clause. The statute is constitutional because (a) nonresidents
are a peculiar source of evil to resident Alaskans in the employment
context and (b) there is a reasonable relationship between the danger
posed by nonresidents and the discrimination imposed upon them.
Alaska’s unique circumstances warrant the former conclusion, while the
narrow focus and flexible application of Alaska Hire ensure the latter.
The first hurdle for Alaska Hire to overcome is whether it burdens a
fundamental right.172 “[O]ne of the privileges which the [Privileges and
Immunities] Clause guarantees to citizens of State A is that of doing
business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the citizens of
that State.”173 This means that the Clause holds “the right of a citizen of
resident or female resident provisions in his memo. See generally Clarkson Memo,
supra note 14. As the constitutionality of those provisions has not been called into
question, this Note does not engage with arguments in their defense.
171. See supra Section III.F (discussing Alaska Hire and the Clarkson Memo).
172. See supra Section III.B.
173. Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 280 (1985) (quoting Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)). However, the Clause does not require that “state
citizenship or residency may never be used by a State to distinguish among
persons.” Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978). Furthermore,
a state does not always have to “apply all its laws or all its services equally to
anyone, resident or nonresident, who may request it so to do.” Id.
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one State to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of
engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation” to
be a fundamental one.174 In the case of Alaska Hire, the fundamental right
to engage in trade (i.e. to seek employment) appears to be burdened for
nonresidents. By imposing a hiring preference for residents, nonresidents
are disadvantaged from engaging in trade on the basis of their residency.
Because Alaska Hire burdens a fundamental right, determining the
statute’s constitutionality requires further analysis.
For Alaska Hire to pass constitutional muster, nonresidents must
pose a peculiar source of evil in the context of employment and that threat
must have a reasonable relationship to the discrimination the statute
imposes upon them.175 In Hicklin v. Orbeck, the oil and gas provision of
Alaska Hire was not supported by sufficient evidence that nonresidents
posed a peculiar source of evil, so the Court was unable to find a
constitutionally sufficient reason for the statute’s discrimination.176 There,
the evidence indicated that unemployment among residents was
attributable to their lack of training in the oil and gas context, not the
competition of nonresident workers.177 In Robison v. Francis, the court was
similarly unable to find that nonresidents posed a peculiar source of evil,
this time reasoning that because Alaska’s unemployment rate was close
to that of the national average, there was no evil to address.178
In Alaska today, nonresidents surely pose a peculiar source of evil to
the employment prospects of residents, thus creating a constitutionally
sufficient reason for Alaska Hire’s discriminatory effect. The reasoning of
Hicklin and Robison are inapplicable to the contemporary context. First,
the gap in skills between residents and nonresidents has closed. The
plurality of construction workers in Alaska are classified as unskilled
laborers.179 This means that in Alaska today, unskilled residents are not
competing with skilled nonresidents as in the Alaska of 1978 seen in
Hicklin. Instead, the contemporary public works employment situation
features unskilled nonresidents taking positions that could be filled by
unskilled residents. For skilled positions, both Alaska and the federal
government have implemented job training programs which did not exist
at the time of Hicklin.180 These programs mean that more Alaskans today
174. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418, 430 (1870).
175. See supra Section III.B.
176. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526 (1978).
177. Id. at 526–27.
178. Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259, 262–63 (Alaska 1986).
179. See KREIGER & WHITNEY, supra note 54, at 10 (noting construction laborers
account for the largest occupation cohort in Alaska’s construction industry).
180. See generally Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
3101–3361 (2018) (increasing coordination among workforce development
programs); ALASKA DEP’T LAB. & WORKFORCE DEV., PY 2012-2016: ALASKA
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are skilled workers able to compete with skilled nonresidents than was
the case in 1978. Residents are thus on more even footing with their
nonresident competitors. Second, Alaska’s unemployment rate is not
growing closer to the national average as it was in Robison.181 Instead, it
has stubbornly remained higher than the national average.182 This trend
has held steady for nearly 40 years since Robison. Furthermore, the Alaska
of Robison was less than 30 years removed from the onset of economic
benefits associated with statehood.183 Then, the effect of nonresidents on
unemployment in a still-developing economy could be expected to
dissipate with time.184 Now, over 60 years after statehood, what could
have been dismissed as a dying trend in unemployment among residents
has proven to be a permanent condition.
The combination of these two factors means that there is indeed an
evil in the form of intransigent unemployment and that nonresidents are
a source of that evil in the public works context; the barriers to finding
nonresidents a peculiar source of evil found in previous cases are thus no
longer applicable to Alaska Hire. One might suggest that this is the case
in every state, not just Alaska. However, the situation in Alaska is truly
unique among all states. The state’s massive size makes it hard for
residents to travel elsewhere for work — residents must work near where
they live, or likely not work at all.185 Weak or negative job growth means
that there are fewer and fewer positions in Alaska, compounding the
problem created by residents’ reliance on local jobs.186 Finally,
nonresidents represent a large portion of the Alaskan workforce, meaning
they take up a particularly high percentage of positions that could be
filled by qualified residents.187 These nonresidents have shown a capacity
to travel to work, meaning they can readily compete for jobs elsewhere.188
The alchemy of these factors means the argument that nonresidents
INTEGRATED WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2012) (describing Alaska’s
workforce training programs, includes the Adult and Dislocated Worker
Programs, and the Youth Program); State Training and Employment Program
(STEP),
ALASKA
DEP’T
LAB.
&
WORKFORCE
DEV.,
https://labor.alaska.gov/dets/step.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2021) (describing
the STEP program, which is limited to Alaska residents, and its goal “to enhance
the quality [sic] and make Alaska job training and employment assistance easily
available to employers, employees, and future workers”).
181. Robison, 713 P.2d at 263.
182. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
183. Cf. J. TOMAS HEXNER ET AL., HEX, INC., PUERTO RICAN STATEHOOD: A
PRECONDITION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (1993) (asserting that statehood is
“essential” to “future economic growth”).
184. Id.
185. See supra Section II.A.
186. See supra Section II.B.
187. See supra Section II.C.
188. See supra Section II.C.
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compete with residents everywhere does not carry the same cache in
Alaska. Due to the idiosyncratic situation in the state, there is a
constitutionally sufficient substantial reason for Alaska Hire’s
discrimination against nonresidents.
To underline this contention, it should be noted that the economic
situation in contemporary Alaska looks remarkably similar to that
described in United Building and Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of
Camden.189 There, the United States Supreme Court refused to overturn
the challenged resident hiring preference under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.190 The city of Camden had implemented its resident
hiring preference for public works to address a combination of unabated
joblessness and demographic changes that were leading to a reduced tax
base, as well as nonresidents “‘liv[ing] off’ Camden without ‘liv[ing] in’”
the city.191 Similarly, Alaska today faces stubborn unemployment and
demographic trends that reduce residents’ economic power, while
employed nonresident workers prosper from economic benefits that
would otherwise flow to residents.192 Nonresident workers experience the
upsides of the Alaskan infrastructure and economy, but do not live in the
state, shoulder a full tax burden, or vote — the very things which make
their employment possible. Alaska residents should be able to reap what
they sow.
The final consideration in determining the constitutionality of
Alaska Hire under the Privileges and Immunities Clause is if there is a
reasonable relationship between the threat posed by non-citizens and the
discrimination imposed upon them. The Hicklin court found that the oil
and gas lease provision of Alaska Hire lacked a substantial relationship
because it applied to work contractors that were not in a contractual
relationship with the state.193 The Robison court found the requirement
that residents account for ninety percent of a workforce constitutionally
deficient because it was almost entirely preclusive of nonresident
workers.194 As in Hicklin, the provision was also problematic as it applied
to entities not in a contractual relationship with the state.195 In Robison, the
court found that this far-reaching discrimination merited little deference
to the state when analyzing the relationship between the discrimination
and the threat it responded to.196 Conversely, the Camden court looked
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

465 U.S. 208 (1984).
Id. at 210.
Id. at 222.
See supra Section II.
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 527, 530 (1978).
Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259, 265 (Alaska 1986).
Id.
Id. at 264–65.
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favorably upon the fact that the relevant hiring preference was “limited
in its scope to” contractors and subcontractors.197 This limit was found to
cure the constitutionally problematic “ripple effect” exhibited in
Hicklin.198
While the courts in Hicklin and Robison found the relationship
between the threat posed by nonresidents and the hiring preference
constitutionally deficient, the court in State v. Antonich199 found the
opposite.200 In Antonich, the Wyoming Preference Act required
contractors to employ available qualified Wyoming laborers for public
works projects in preference to nonresident workers.201 In analyzing the
link between the reasons for the statute and the discrimination practiced,
the court noted that historical resident hiring preference statutes had
“swept too broadly to survive challenges brought under the privilegesand-immunities clause,” specifically citing the portion of Alaska Hire
struck down in Hicklin.202 The court viewed the Wyoming statute
favorably in comparison to these broad laws, finding the Wyoming
version to be sufficiently tailored as it (a) did not seek to eradicate
unemployment due to factors unrelated to nonresidents, (b) addressed a
specific sector of the economy (construction), and (c) limited its reach to
public works.203
The contemporary version of Alaska Hire looks more like the statute
at issue in Antonich than it does the earlier version of the statute
challenged in Hicklin and Robison. The iterations of Alaska Hire that have
been overturned were broad in scope and rigid in application. Today’s
version of the law is much narrower in its scope than the statute’s
previous iterations. This is because the law does not apply to suppliers of
contractors and subcontractors, thus restraining the scope of the
discrimination to employment positions in close contractual relation to
state funding.204 This contrasts with the law overturned in Hicklin, which
197. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
223 (1984).
198. Id.
199. 694 P.2d 60 (Wyo. 1985).
200. Id. at 64. Of course, Antonich is a Wyoming Supreme Court case. Absent
some truly unprecedented legal gymnastics, the Antonich court’s reasoning would
be afforded only persuasive authority in a challenge to Alaska Hire.
201. Id. at 60–61.
202. Id. at 62.
203. Id. at 63.
204. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.180(a) (2019). It should be noted that the provision
does explicitly apply to subcontractors. But see ALASKA DEP’T LAB. & WORKFORCE
DEV., ALASKA RESIDENT HIRE EMPLOYMENT PREFERENCE INFORMATION,
http://www.labor.state.ak.us/lss/forms/employment-pref-info.pdf (last visited
Apr. 2, 2020) (stating that “[t]his hiring preference . . . must be met every
workweek by each contractor/subcontractor”). While the scope of the
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applied to contractors, subcontractors of contractors, and suppliers of
contractors and subcontractors,205 creating a constitutionally problematic
“ripple effect.”206
The contemporary version of Alaska Hire further differentiates itself
from the iteration overturned in Robison by offering a more flexible
method of application. Requiring the Commissioner to determine
whether or not a zone of underemployment exists is critical in
differentiating the current version from its forbearers. The determination
process means the resident hiring preference no longer indiscriminately
applies to every single public works contract in the state.207 Instead, the
preference only applies to declared ‘zones,’ which are identified through
an active consideration of various factors before such a declaration is
made.208 The contemporary version of the statute also lacks a hiring
requirement like the one overturned in Robison, which effectively
required public works projects to be fully staffed by residents.209 Instead,
the required level of resident employment is set to a level that is
considered on a zone-by-zone basis.210 Where the Robison hiring
preference had a blanket level of application,211 the current version is set
to a level that is determined after deliberation.212 Additionally, the
resident hiring preference of a zone is revisited every two years, meaning
the temporal scope of the discrimination is also circumscribed.213 These

contemporary statute is narrower than its predecessors, the hiring preference’s
application to subcontractors is potentially problematic. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437
U.S. 518, 530 (1978) (finding the extension of Alaska Hire’s oil and gas lease
provision “to employers who have no connection whatsoever with the State’s oil
and gas, perform no work on state land, have no contractual relationship with the
State, and receive no payment from the State” supportive of the law’s
unconstitutionality); Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259, 265 (Alaska 1986) (finding
that the application of Alaska Hire to entities not directly party to a contract with
the State weighed against the statute’s constitutionality); see also supra Sections
III.B,III.C.
205. ALASKA STAT. § 38.40.050 (1972) (repealed 1978).
206. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
223 (1984).
207. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.150 (2019) (requiring a determination that
a zone is eligible for a resident hiring preference before imposing a preference rate
that is set on a zone-by-zone basis and revisited bi-annually), with ALASKA STAT. §
36.10.010 (1960) (repealed 1986) (“In all cases of public works projects, preference
must be given to Alaska residents.”).
208. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.150(c) (2019).
209. § 1(a), 1960 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 177 (enacted as ALASKA STAT. §§
36.10.010–.110 (1960)), invalidated by Robison, 713 P.2d 259 (requiring ninety to
ninety-five percent of workers be residents).
210. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.150(b) (2019).
211. § 1(a), 1960 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 177.
212. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.150(b) (2019).
213. Id. § 36.10.150(a).
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characteristics combine to make the current iteration of the law much
more flexible than its unconstitutionally rigid predecessors.
Like the statute upheld in Antonich,214 the current version of Alaska
Hire focuses on inherently local public works contracts, which deal
specifically with state-owned property. Any discrimination mandated in
relation to those contracts must be analyzed under the federal Privileges
and Immunities Clause with a degree of deference to the state.215 This is
because states are granted “more leeway . . . in [their] perception of ‘local
evils and in prescribing appropriate cures’ when [they are] acting in a
proprietary capacity, as where ‘[they are] merely setting conditions on the
expenditures of funds [they] control[].’”216 This means the state will be
accorded deference if it determines that a resident hiring preference on
projects funded by state money is substantially related to the ‘evil’ posed
by nonresidents. This also means that the hiring preference is not the
protectionist cudgel that Attorney General Clarkson describes.217 Instead,
it is a finely-honed tool for Alaska to rectify an unemployment problem
caused by state-specific circumstances. This focus on a specific sector of
the economy and limited application to public works mimics the
constitutionally sufficient statute upheld in Antonich.218
The contemporary version of Alaska Hire is constitutionally
sufficient under the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it cures the
defects of its forbearers. While earlier versions of the statute failed to
muster defenses that established nonresidents as a peculiar source of evil,
the contemporary conditions of Alaska make circumscribed
discrimination against this group for the benefit of residents lawful. In
addressing this peculiar evil, the current iteration of Alaska Hire is a
narrow, flexible law where its predecessors were broad and rigid. The
contemporary version of Alaska Hire has key differences from its
unconstitutional precursors, the sum of which make the current statute
constitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United
States Constitution.

214. State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 61–62 (Wyo. 1985).
215. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 529 (1978) (“[A] State’s ownership of the
property with which the statute is concerned is a factor – although often the
crucial factor – to be considered in evaluating whether the statute’s discrimination
against noncitizens violates the [Privileges and Immunities] Clause.”).
216. Robison v. Francis, 713 P.2d 259, 264 (Alaska 1986) (quoting United Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984)).
217. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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The Validity of Alaska Hire Under the Alaska Equal Protection
Clause

Showing that Alaska Hire is constitutional under the federal
Privileges and Immunities Clause is only half the battle, as Attorney
General Clarkson also attacks the statute as violative of the Alaska Equal
Protection Clause. The Attorney General’s analysis of Alaska Hire is,
again, flawed. Under the Alaska Equal Protection Clause, the statute is
constitutional because (a) protecting the employment prospects of
Alaskans is a compelling state interest and (b) a resident hiring preference
is the least restrictive means to further that interest.
For Alaska Hire to withstand constitutional scrutiny, a court must
first identify the importance of both the individual interest impaired by
the statute and the state interest motivating the law.219 The individual
interest at issue here is the right to engage in an economic endeavor in a
particular industry. In Enserch, this was held to be an “important” right
for purposes of the Alaska Equal Protection Clause.220 The state interest is
the reduction of resident unemployment. The Enserch court found that
citing this interest in the economically distressed zones provision
“conceal[ed] the underlying objective of economically assisting one class
over another.”221 Accordingly, the court found that the statute had the
illegitimate purpose of economically benefitting unemployed workers in
one region at the expense of workers in another region.222
Here, because an important right is burdened, the state interest must
be compelling in order to survive a constitutional challenge.223 Looking
beneath the hood, it might appear that the current version of Alaska Hire
seeks to economically assist one class over another as in Enserch.
However, the contemporary iteration of the statute makes a critical
distinction between itself and the version of the law overturned in
Enserch: currently, the Commissioner can determine that the entire state
is a zone of underemployment,224 thus benefiting all qualified residents of
the state with a hiring preference. In fact, the entire state has historically
been subjected to a resident hiring preference under the current version
of Alaska Hire.225 This undermines the concern of the Enserch court that

219. State v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 631 (Alaska 1989).
220. Id. at 632.
221. Id. at 634.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.990 (2019).
225. See Clarkson Memo, supra note 14, at 5 (“Since [Enserch], the Department of
Labor and Workforce Development has consistently designated the entire State as
a ‘zone of underemployment.’”).

38.1 MCGUIRE (DO NOT DELETE)

2021

5/11/2021 10:42 PM

PUTTING THE LAST FRONTIER TO WORK

153

one class of Alaskans would be favored over others. In keeping with
arguments made above, the disparate treatment the statute affords
nonresidents must yield to the unique situation Alaska finds itself in.226
Indeed, it is these unique circumstances which create a compelling state
interest in reduction of resident unemployment in the specific context of
Alaska. The problem is so profound that to find alleviating it is not a
compelling state interest would be to raise the requirements for such an
interest untenably high.
The importance of the state interest can be further strengthened by
comparing the case of Alaska Hire to that of the Alaska Workers
Compensation Act (“the Act”) as seen in Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v.
Brown.227 The Act required that disability assistance granted to
nonresident workers be adjusted based on a comparative ratio between
the average weekly wage in Alaska and that in the other state.228 The court
found that “the State has important interests in avoiding disincentives to
rehabilitation and in creating incentives for injured workers to go back to
work . . . .”229 The court further found that “the effectiveness of these
incentives may depend on” factors which differentiate residents from
nonresidents.230 Alaska Hire hews as closely to the interest it furthers —
reduction of resident unemployment — as the Act did to the interest it
furthers. The tight fit of Alaska Hire and the relevant interest is especially
close given the geographical and economic constraints that make
unemployment such a problem in Alaska. As in the Act, Alaska Hire
incentivizes resident employment through differentiation based upon
resident status. Accordingly, Brown supports the contention that Alaska
Hire furthers an important state interest via permissible differentiation
between residents and nonresidents.
A fundamental individual interest is implicated in the case of Alaska
Hire, which requires the means used to further the state interest to be the
least restrictive available.231 In Enserch, the court noted that because the
hiring preference was limited to residents of economically distressed
zones, the measure was tailored to address local, not state-wide,
unemployment.232 Furthermore, because the provision imposed the same
226. The difficulty Alaskans face in overcoming unemployment due to
geographic, demographic, and economic reasons makes joblessness a problem
that is uniquely difficult for the state to overcome. See supra Section II. The
exceptionalism of the state’s unemployment epidemic is highlighted by the fact
that it has not abated for over sixty years. See supra Section IV.A.
227. 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984).
228. Id. at 266–67.
229. Id. at 273.
230. Id.
231. State v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624, 631–32 (Alaska 1989).
232. Id. at 633.
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hiring preference on all distressed zones, regardless of the level of need
within the zone, residents of areas in less distress were unfairly
advantaged over residents of areas in more distress. 233
The current version of Alaska Hire cures the defects that made the
iteration overturned in Enserch legally deficient. First, the contemporary
law allows the hiring preference to cover the entire state of Alaska, not
just discrete zones.234 Rather paradoxically, the statute’s broader
applicability in this context means that it more closely fits the state interest
that it furthers than was the case in Enserch. This is because the state
interest is unemployment throughout the state, not just in discrete regions.
The compelling state interest in Alaska Hire covers the entire state, so the
statute’s geographic applicability will necessarily have a broad sweep.
The resident hiring preference requirement is the least restrictive
means possible in this context because it gets to the essence of the state
interest: ensuring resident unemployment does not stem from
nonresidents obtaining employment at the expense of residents.
Requiring a certain level of resident employment on projects funded
through state expenditures is highly targeted. Furthermore, only a certain
industry is targeted, and only projects with state funding are targeted
within that industry. The zone of underemployment provision requires
residents to be qualified for the work, meaning residents that qualify for
the preference would already be competing for the positions protected by
the statute.235 Unlike the economically distressed zones provision
invalidated in Enserch, which imposed a rigid fifty percent hiring
preference requirement, the zone of underemployment provision
requires that the hiring preference requirement be set after consideration
of various factors.236 This pre-implementation deliberation ensures that
the level of the hiring preference is closely tailored to fit the prevailing
economic conditions. Accordingly, the resident hiring preference in the
current version of Alaska Hire represents the least restrictive means by
which the compelling state interest of reducing unemployment among
Alaska residents can be furthered.

233. Id. at 634.
234. ALASKA STAT. § 36.10.990 (2019).
235. Id. § 36.10.150(b) (2019).
236. Compare id. § 36.10.160(a) (2019) (requiring a hiring preference of at least
fifty percent), invalidated by State v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 P.2d 624
(Alaska 1989), with id. § 36.10.150(b) (2019) (requiring the determination of a hiring
preference be set based upon statutory factors).
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Alaska Hire is legally sufficient under the Alaska Equal Protection
Clause. The statute furthers a compelling state interest, and it does so
through the least restrictive means practicable. By not falling for the legal
traps that previously invalidated provisions did, the current version of
Alaska Hire should survive Equal Protection scrutiny.

V. CONCLUSION
When Attorney General Clarkson’s memo cast doubt on the
constitutionality of Alaska Hire, he imperiled an important part of the
state’s arsenal in combating its unemployment problem. While the future
of the statute remains unknown, this Note will hopefully prove useful in
any legal defense of the law that may arise. While any such defense may
not be an easy one, this Note has shown that Alaska Hire is constitutional
under both the federal Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Alaska
Equal Protection Clause.
However, the statute is not a cure-all. In fact, it represents only one
piece in the larger puzzle that is the solution to Alaska’s unemployment
epidemic. If the state is to overcome its historically high unemployment
rate, it will need to invest more in general education, job training, and
economic diversification. Alaska Hire is an important piece in this puzzle
as it is a solution that works narrowly within the domain of the state’s
control. By limiting itself to public works projects, Alaska Hire enables
the state to directly intervene in the joblessness crisis on its own turf, from
the urban hub of Anchorage to the remote dirt roads of Utqiaġvik. The
need for public works projects will never dry up, and so as long as Alaska
Hire is on the books, it will contribute to mitigating Alaska’s
unemployment epidemic.

